Introduction
Refugees enjoy a distinct and unique standard of protection under international law within the framework of the international regime for the protection of refugees, which is based on the Protocol. 2 The Refugee Convention constitutes a continuation of the legal regime for the protection of refugees established in international law in the early 20th Century and it predates the establishment of the international regime for the protection of human rights born in the United Nations (UN) era.
While the forced movement of persons across borders and the granting of asylum to those fleeing persecution are historical constants, refugee protection only became a matter of international law after the First World War. The transformations derived from the dismantling of the Empires and the rapid growth in the control of the movement of persons across international borders led to a response by the League of Nations. And in this way, those movements of persons became of a distinct nature in relation to previous ones, in so far as they left the domain of national jurisdiction to become matters of international concern.
3 The League of Nations soon received the mandate to find a solution to the refugee problem. In this way, the understanding developed that refugees were a special group of migrants that required a response from the international community. The adoption of international treaties establishing the standard of treatment in relation to refugees reflected the mutual recognition among states of their obligations in relation to this category of forced migrants. 4 It is important to notice that these early instruments did not include one of the most fundamental rights of refugees, namely, the right to be granted asylum, an essential premise for the enjoyment of other rights. It is at this time when asylum and refugee status became separate matters, as the definition of the qualifying features of who is a refugee, as well as the status afforded to individuals meeting those criteria, became matters of international law, while the granting of asylum for people fleeing persecution remained (as it had always been) a matter of national sovereignty. This separation between asylum and refugee status was also reflected in the refugee instruments adopted under the auspices of the UN, as neither the Refugee Convention nor its Protocol enshrine the right to asylum for refugees. Indeed, the drafters of the Refugee Convention were well aware that refugees could find themselves without a country of asylum and therefore the Conference that adopted the Convention 3 recommended "that Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that they act in concert in a true spirit of international cooperation in order that these refugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement" (Recommendation D). The universal regime for the protection of refugees has been complemented overtime by regional instruments on specific aspects of refugee protection, notably the refugee definition and the standard of rights that they are entitle to (refugee status), which do not include the right to asylum or do not do so in an explicit manner.
5
I have argued elsewhere that the main contribution of International Human Rights Law to the protection of refugees has been precisely to amend the situation just described, in particular by strengthening the protection against refoulement and by recognising a right to asylum as a human right. 6 The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)
included asylum among its provisions 7 and while attempts to translate Article 14 UDHR into a legally binding rule failed in the universal context, the right to asylum is enshrined in international human rights instruments of regional scope. The Cartagena Declaration expands the refugee definition but does not address issues of status. Article II of the African Convention deals with asylum but it only imposes an obligation on State Parties to "use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees". In the EU, Directive 2011/95/EU (the so-called Qualifications Directive) does not refer to a right to asylum as such; however the right to be granted status is enshrined in its provisions. For a construction of refugee status and subsidiary protection in the Directive as a right to asylum, see M-T. Gil-Bazo, "Refugee status and subsidiary protection under EC law: the qualification directive and the right to be granted asylum", in A.
Baldaccini, E. Guild, and H. Toner (eds. 
4
Rights Law -if only of regional scope-has enshrined the right to be granted asylum, thus resulting in States acquiring an international law obligation in that respect.
A further most significant element is the way in which refugees can invoke the protection offered by norms of International Human Rights law in order to conform a standard of treatment at all stages in the forced migration process. While the international regime for the protection of refugees offers a specific and unique standard of treatment, international human rights law strengthens that legal framework by allowing refugees to invoke the protection of norms whose scope of application may be wider than those in the refugee regime, such as for instance, the absolute prohibition of refoulement to situations where there is a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This in turn leads to the transformation of the refugee definition. 9 As Lambert explains, the refugee definition in the Refugee Convention "has no equivalent in human rights law [as international human rights instruments apply] to everyone, including refugees in the broadest sense of the word (particularly asylum-seekers, rejected asylum-seekers and refugees denied protection on grounds of national security or public order)." 10 Chetail argues that human rights law has become the ultimate benchmark for determining who is a refugee. The authoritative intrusion of human rights has proved to be instrumental in infusing a common and dynamic understanding of the refugee definition that is more consonant with and loyal to the evolution of international law.
11
These features of the international regime for the protection of human rights have strengthened the position of refugees in International Law. While the international refugee law regime established by the Refugee Convention and its Protocol remains the primary source of refugee rights worldwide, an attempt to identify the rights of refugees under international law by reference to the rights found solely under these two instruments is severely limited, as it overlooks legal entitlements that refugees may hold (as refugees and in other capacities) under other international instruments of universal and regional scope. In fact,
Chetail explains that "human rights law has radically informed and transformed the distinctive tenets of the Geneva Convention to such an extent that the normative frame of forced 9 Except when otherwise indicated, the term "refugee" in this paper is used in a broad sense, to mean individuals entitled to protection under various different legal grounds. 10 H. Despite attempts to reopen the discussion in the same terms (that is, the need to conduct a balancing test when national security issues are at stake), the Court has maintained its position on the absolute nature of the prohibition to remove someone to a risk of torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In the Saadi case, the UK attempted to reverse the Chahal doctrine. Although Saadi was a case against Italy and the Italian Government was not questioning the absolute nature of Article 3, the UK Government sought to intervene as a third-party in order to try and reverse the Court's well-established case-law,
given that in its view, "because of its rigidity that principle had caused many difficulties for the Contracting States by preventing them in practice from enforcing expulsion measures".
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The UK argued that "in cases concerning the threat created by international terrorism, the approach followed by the Court in Chahal (which did not reflect a universally recognised moral imperative and was in contradiction with the intentions of the original signatories of the Convention) had to be altered and clarified".
40
The UK's reference to a "universally recognised moral imperative" is intriguing, as it is its reference to "the intentions of the original signatories of the Convention". Either the UK suggests that the prohibition to remove someone to a risk of torture has no strong moral foundation or it persists in attempting to build the argument (consistently rejected by IHRMBs) that although State Parties to the ECHR intended to create a legally binding obligation among themselves to prohibit torture, they also intended to retain the power to put someone at a risk of torture elsewhere, as long as such risk is at the hands of another State.
The morality of torture has been explored at length in the literature and it is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to note that one of the scholars who has explored the relationship between the morality and the legality of torture at length concludes that torture must always remain illegal:
Does the possibility that torture might be justifiable in some of the rarefied situations which can be imagined provide any reason to consider relaxing the legal prohibitions against it? Absolutely not. The ECtHR rejected the UK arguments in Saadi and it took the chance to note that it had already done so before: "The Court further observes that similar arguments to those put forward by the third-party intervener in the present case have already been rejected in the The absolute nature of the prohibition to remove someone to a risk of torture has also been affirmed by the IHRMBs in the universal system. As in the case of the ECHR, the ICCPR does not include a specific non-refoulement provision. Although the HRC's attitude was hesitant at first towards finding an implicit prohibition of non-refoulement in the ICCPR (and notably on Articles 6 and 7, on the right to life and the prohibition of torture, respectively), it evolved over time to accept such prohibition, most likely influenced by the case-law of the literature, 73 while States in the Latin American region affirm its jus cogens nature, 74 a view which has also found some echo in the literature. 75 
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Protection under human rights law: complementary protection
The principle of non-refoulement in human rights instruments, which allows for no derogation or exception and applies without a link to a particular status (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion), and thus broadens the protection offered by the Refugee Convention has had an enormous impact on the way in which refugee protection is now conceptualised. Developments by IHRMBs have been incorporated into national legislation, although this has taken different forms, notably, the granting of a single status (as it is the case in the US and Canada, and used to be the case in Spain prior to the 1994 reform), while in the EU they have led to a specific and separate status called subsidiary protection. I have argued elsewhere that individuals who benefit from the protection of this "expanded" principle of non-refoulement have a right to asylum, together with individuals who meet the criteria in the Refugee Convention. 76 The term asylum refers to the institution for protection, which is historically well known, and it is different from refugee status, as the latter refers to one of the categories of individuals -among others-who qualify for such protection under international law and the standard of treatment that they are to receive. The term and content of asylum as the institution for protection known historically to international law, is not defined by any international instruments. State practice shows that it has been conceptualised in different ways through history to include different categories of individuals, including refugees within the meaning of the Refugee Convention, but also others. This is currently the case in a number of constitutions worldwide. 
International Human Rights Monitoring Bodies and Findings of Persecution and/or

Risk of Prohibited Treatment on Refugee Convention grounds
20
The role of IHRMBs seems to be taking a step beyond the mere finding of a violation of the principle of non-refoulement to ascertaining a causal link between the risk of prohibited treatment under international human rights law and one of the Refugee Convention grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion). This raises important issues in so far as it suggests that the person -who must have exhausted all domestic remedies before bringing a claim to an IHRMB-is not only protected by international human rights law against refoulement, but is also a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. Yet, IHRMBs have no jurisdiction to determine refugee status and therefore, such findings do not automatically result in the recognition of refugee status.
In recent years a trend seems to be emerging for IHRMBs to go beyond the finding that a forced removal is or would be in violation of the relevant treaty provision to link the risk of such violation to one of the Refugee Convention grounds, such as religious beliefs, ethnicity, membership of a particular social group or (real or imputed) political opinion.
Risk of prohibited treatment arising from race
IHMBs have often made reference to the individual's ethnic membership as the source of the risk of prohibited treatment. As Hathaway and Foster explain the term race is to be given a broad meaning "to include all forms of identifiable ethnicity." 84 They further explain that race within the meaning of the Refugee Convention "may be defined by ethnicity or cultural or linguistic distinctiveness, and frequently overlaps with other Convention grounds."
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In the much discussed case of Salah Sheekh, the ECtHR found that risk of prohibited treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR arouse from the applicant's membership of a minority and that such membership (given the particular circumstances of the case) was in itself sufficient evidence of a real risk. having studied the materials on file, UNHCR has decided to annul the refugee certificates previously issued to a number of the complainants.
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The complainants also noted that "[a]n expert from UNHCR in Geneva participated in the examination and had access to all meetings and documentation" in the extradition process. 
98
The HRC therefore found that expulsion would constitute a violation of Articles 6 and 7
ICCPR:
In the light of the situation prevailing in Pakistan, due weight must be given to the author's allegations. In this context, the Committee has taken note of the allegations that a fatwa had been issued against the author and a First Information Report had 94 Ibid., para. 13.5. This author contacted UNHCR Geneva to seek confirmation of its involvement in this case, which was confirmed (exchanges on file with author). 95 Ibid., para. 13.7. 96 Ibid., para. 13.8. Likewise, in Hamida, 103 the Committee considered "that the author has provided substantial evidence of a real and personal risk of his being subjected to treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant, on account of his dissent in the Tunisian police" 104 and concluded that "there is a real risk of the author being regarded as a political opponent and therefore subjected to torture. This risk is increased by the asylum application which he submitted in Canada, since this makes it all the more possible that the author will be seen as a regime opponent." 105 The
Committee found that the expulsion order (if enforced) would constitute a violation of the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 7 ICCPR. 99 Ibid., para. 9.8. 
Risk of prohibited treatment arising from membership from a particular social group
Membership from a particular social group has also been found to be at the origin of the risk.
In M. I. 106 The Committee further reminded the State Party that it is also "under the obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future." 
Protection under human rights instruments, refugee status and the role of UNHCR
The previous sections have shown that the interpretation of international human rights treaties by IHRMBs cannot be dissociated from its implications for the interpretation of the Refugee Convention. The obvious conclusion to the previous analysis is that if the bodies entrusted by
States Parties with the authority to undertake an authentic interpretation of international human rights treaties find that an applicant is at risk of prohibited treatment due to his or her ethnic background, religious beliefs, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, then it follows that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. While IHRMBs do not have jurisdiction to interpret the Refugee Convention, State Parties to this instrument who are also bound by other international human rights treaties must find a way to reconcile their obligations under the various instruments.
In particular, the question arises as to the mechanism to implement decisions by IHRMBs in the domestic legal order, and in particular, the consideration that the means that a State Party to the relevant instrument may choose to undertake must necessarily be those that reconcile its obligations both under International Human Rights Law and under International
Refugee Law. And this may mean that the only appropriate means to do so is by recognising refugee status and granting asylum.
In this regard, the role of UNHCR is crucial. While UNHCR is not an IHRMB and it lacks the impartiality and objectivity that is expected from IHRMBs, its mandate requires 
Moving Beyond: Human Rights Protection and Status
While the role of IHMBs in strengthening the protection of refugees against refoulement is well established, these bodies have always been cautious about the nature of the measures that
States may need to take, stressing that the nature of the obligation to protect is one of result, Consequently, the State party is not required to modify its decision(s) concerning the granting of asylum; on the other hand, it does have a responsibility to find solutions that will enable it to take all necessary measures to comply with the provisions of article 3 of the Convention. These solutions may be of a legal nature (e.g. decision to admit the applicant temporarily), but also of a political nature (e.g. action to find a third State willing to admit the applicant to its territory and undertaking not to return or expel him in its turn). 114 Two years later, the CTeAT qualified its position in a case which did not involve a risk of expulsion, as the complainant had a residence permit and his application for renewal had not yet been decided:
Noting that the order for the author's expulsion is still in force, the Committee considers that the possibility that the State party will grant the author an extended temporary permit for medical treatment is not sufficient to fulfil the State party's obligations under article 3 of the Convention.
115
While the CteAT did not identify which particular immigration status would be required in order to comply with Article 3 CAT it made it clear that temporary residence permits based on circumstances whose nature is also temporary were in themselves insufficient to meet the standards of protection against refoulement required by the Convention.
Given the more comprehensive nature of other international human rights treaties, notably the ICCPR and the ECHR, their IHRMBs have had the chance to pronounce themselves on issues regarding the specific attachments -other than nationality-between individuals and States which may under certain circumstances require the State not merely not to expel the individual but rather to take positive measures to ensure their stay and integration in the host country.
The HRC has considered quite extensively the relationship between individuals with
States other than the one of nationality, and in particular the legal relevance of significant attachments other than nationality. 116 In Stewart, 117 the Committee was asked to define what constitutes one's "own country" within the meaning of Article 12(4) ICCPR: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country". Mr Stewart was a British citizen who had moved to Canada at the age of seven and although he claimed that he only learnt that he had never acquired Canadian nationality as a result of proceedings resulting from his 42 criminal convictions.
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The HRC elaborated on the notion of own's "own country" in the Convention. The
Committee noted that the scope of the phrase "his own country" is broader than the concept "country of his nationality", which it embraces and which some regional human rights treaties use in guaranteeing the right to enter a country. Moreover, in seeking to understand the meaning of article 12, paragraph 4, account must also be had of the language of article 13 of the Covenant. That provision speaks of "an alien lawfully in the territory of a State party" in limiting the rights of States to expel an individual categorized as an "alien". It would thus appear that "his own country" as a concept applies to individuals who are nationals and to certain categories of individuals who, while not nationals in a formal sense, are also not "aliens" within the meaning of article 13, although they may be considered as aliens for other purposes.
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The question is therefore to determine which categories of non-nationals can invoke the protection of Article 12(4). The Committee acknowledges that determining who, in addition to nationals, is protected by this provision is less clear and it affirms that since the concept "his own country" is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality acquired on birth or by conferral, it embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his special ties to or claims in relation to a given country cannot there be considered to be a mere alien. Hailbronner agrees with a broader interpretation of the right to return to one's own country.
Writing in the same year than the HRC was discussing the scope of the right, Hailbronner notes that the right to return as a matter of international law is not restricted to nationals. He explains that nationality may not always be clear and that States may be able to deprive certain groups among their population from nationality, and he affirms that international law offers legal basis for the recognition of a right to return to aliens who have been lawfully resident for a long period of time. More recently, the HRC pronounced itself again on the notion of one's own country, in two controversial decisions. In Nystrom, 129 the majority in this case "borrowed" language from the minority in Stewart, which later found its way into the General Comment on Article 12, to note that there may be close and enduring connections between a person and a country, which may be stronger than those of nationality, and that the determination of one's own country required consideration of long standing residence, close personal and family ties and intentions to remain. 130 The HRC then found that the complainant had established that Australia was his own country and that there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one's own country could be reasonable. A State party must not, by stripping a person of nationality or by expelling an individual to a third country, arbitrarily prevent this person from returning to his or her own country. 131 Like in Stewart, the decision prompted dissenting opinions by Neuman, Iwasawa, Rodley, Keller, and O'Flaherty who considered that the interpretation of Article 12 necessarily required a link with nationality or that it would only apply when the individual was deprived from any effective nationality. 132 The Australian Government has also expressed its disagreements with the HRC's views and despite the authority of this body to undertake an authentic interpretation of the ICCPR and of Australia's recognition of its jurisdiction to hear individual communications, it declared that it would not comply with the Committee's requests to allow and facilitate Mr Nystrom's return to Australia.
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The position of the majority was also expressed in Warsame, 134 where the Committee further elaborated on the circumstances in which the deprivation of the right would be reasonable, noting that "the author's deportation to Somalia impeding his return to his own country would be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of preventing the commission of further crimes and therefore arbitrary." 135 This decision also resulted in dissenting opinions by the minority.
Despite that the Committee's views seem to be polarized in these two cases, as Whittle argues, "these decisions are not radical departures from Stewart; rather, they are best seen as gradual broadenings of the scope of art 12(4) to cater for the unique factual circumstances" of the cases. 136 As he notes, in both cases "there were clear, ongoing and longstanding connections to the resident state and also no connection between the person and the ostensible state of his nationality." 137 to the ECHR (adopted before the ICCPR) protects nationals against expulsion. 138 In
Beldjoudi, 139 Judge Martens elaborated on the notion of one's own country in a concurring Martens' position has been endorsed explicitly or implicitly in different opinions over the years to the Court's case-law. 141 In Boujlifa, 142 'lawfully' (and 'lawfully staying') in the territory. And after a number of years
